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NATIONAL LABOR POLICY: REFLECTIONS
AND DISTORTIONS OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE*
Theodore J St. Antoine**
The impulse behind much of American labor law is profoundly moral.
The sufferings and indignities inflicted on working men, women, and even
children as the industrial revolution enveloped the western world during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led many thoughtful observers
to focus their attention on what was commonly called the "social ques-
tion." From sources as diverse as the classic trade union tracts and histo-
ries of Sidney and Beatrice WebbI and the great social encyclicals of Popes
Leo XIII2 and Pius X13 came increasing demands for fair minimum stan-
dards in compensation and working conditions and for meaningful partici-
pation by working people in setting the terms of their employment. The
Pope in whose honor this lecture series was established could hardly have
been more explicit in Mater et Magistra in justifying the notion of a living
wage and the practice of collective bargaining on the basis of ethical prin-
ciples rather than free market economics:
[Jiust as remuneration for work cannot be left entirely to unregu-
lated competition, neither may it be decided arbitrarily at the will
of the more powerful. Rather, in this matter, the norms of justice
and equity should be strictly observed. This requires that work-
ers receive a wage sufficient to lead a life worthy of man and to
fulfill family responsibilities properly ...
* This article is based on thefifeenth annual Pope John XXIII Lecture delivered by the
author on November 9, 1979, at the Catholic University ofAmerica School of Law, Washing-
ton, D. C
** Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., Fordham College, 1951; J.D., Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1954. The author wishes to thank Vicki Lafer, of the University of
Michigan Law School Class of 1979, for her assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., S. & B. WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 840-50 (1920); S. & B. WEBB,
THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM 1-63 (1920).
2. Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (The Condition of Labor) (1891), in SEVEN GREAT
ENCYCLICALS 1, 8-10, 19-28 (W. Gibbons ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Gibbons].
3. Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (Reconstructing the Social Order) (1931), in Gib-
bons, supra note 2, at 125, 143-52.
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. . . . [E]mployees should have an active part in the affairs of
the enterprise wherein they work, whether these be private or
public . . . [iut is of the utmost importance that productive enter-
prises assume the character of a true human fellowship whose
spirit suffuses the dealings, activities and standing of all its mem-
bers. . . . [T]his is achieved especially by collective bargaining
between associations of workers and those of management.'
Pope John's words parallel those of the principal architect of the original
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Senator Robert Wagner:
Genuine collective bargaining is the only way to attain equality
of bargaining power ...
. . . . [W]ider cooperation [among workers] is necessary, not
only to uphold their own end of the labor bargain but to stabilize
and standardize wage levels, to cope with the sweatshop and the
exploiter, and to exercise their proper voice in economic affairs.'
A major supporter of the Wagner bill, Senator David I. Walsh, Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, appealed even more
pointedly to the "principles of social justice"6 in arguing for employee
freedom to organize and bargain without employer interference. Yet, be-
ing practical men, both Senators Wagner and Walsh were also quite will-
ing to stress such pragmatic considerations as the need to end the bitter,
spreading industrial strife of the mid-1930's7 and "to insure a wise distri-
bution of wealth between management and labor, to maintain a full flow
of purchasing power, and to prevent recurrent depressions. '
Senators Wagner and Walsh and all the other advocates of collective
bargaining down through the years may well have been the most realistic
when grounding their case in ethical considerations and on the least firm
footing when relying on facially more solid economic factors. At the same
time, while one cannot fault the entirely appropriate resort to moral princi-
ples in promoting much of our labor legislation, pitching the debate on
such a lofty level may have had some unfortunate consequences. Certain
issues have been treated almost as if they posed questions of good and evil,
when all they actually presented were problems of finding a proper bal-
4. Pope John XXIII, Mater el Magistra (Christianity and Social Progress) (1961), in
Gibbons, supra note 2, at 219, 234, 238, 289.
5. 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 15 (1949) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST.
N.L.R.A.I.
6. Id. at 10559, reprinted in I LEG. HIST. N.L.R.A., supra note 5, at 1122.
7. Id. at 10351, 10559, reprinted in I LEG. HIST. N.L.R.A., supra note 5, at 1117, 1122
(remarks of Sen. Walsh).




ance of power between labor and management. This article shall develop
these themes in several specific contexts.
I. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC UTILITY OF UNIONS
Unions and collective bargaining have not achieved one of their major
avowed economic objectives, an objective many would say was their pri-
mary if not quintessential objective. They have not brought about a redis-
tribution of wealth between labor and capital. Since the pioneering studies
of Paul Douglas some fifty years ago, it has become a commonplace
among labor economists that the growth of unionism in the United States
cannot be proven to have effectuated any substantial long-term shift in the
distribution of corporate income in favor of the wage-earning class.9 Since
about 1900, employee compensation has ordinarily fluctuated between sev-
enty and eighty percent of corporate income, with at most only a moderate
increase in labor's share over the entire century.'0 Whatever modest gains
have been scored are chiefly attributable to factors other than unionism.
Real wages have increased dramatically, of course, but that appears to be
largely a function of improved productivity, not collective bargaining. "
Nevertheless, some caution must be exercised in drawing this conclusion
since we can never know for certain whether labor would have reaped such
rich rewards from productivity advances in the absence of unionization or
the threat of unionization.
Albert Rees, a leading labor economist, estimates that unions may have
succeeded in raising the wage rates of their members an average of ten to
fifteen percent in recent years, but they have not succeeded in increasing
labor's share in the distribution of income at the expense of capital, even in
their own industries.'2 This paradox is explained by a well-recognized
reaction to unionization on the part of management. Over time, employers
will substitute capital for labor, installing more efficient productive
processes that require fewer workers. Employment will contract, thereby
offsetting the rise in wage rates and leaving the total wage bill relatively
unchanged. Under this analysis, gains won by unionized workers are not
secured at the expense of profits but at the expense of employees or poten-
9. See, e.g., D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 284-89,
463-65 (1970); P. DOUGLAS, REAL WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 1890-1926 (1930); L.
REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 243-46 (7th ed. 1978); Kerr, Labor's
Income Share and the Labor Movement, in NEW CONCEPTS IN WAGE DETERMINATION 260,
280-87 (C. Taylor & F. Pierson eds. 1957).
- 10. L. REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 243-45.
11. Id. at 246-49.
12. A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 79, 94-96 (1962). See also L. REYN-
OLDS, supra note 9, at 506-08.
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tial employees who are squeezed out of the jobs that are eliminated in
organized industries.
From a purely economic perspective, therefore, a genuine question ex-
ists about the utility of unionism and collective bargaining. Indeed, in the
judgment of many careful observers, the strongest arguments for these in-
stitutions lie in quite different directions.' 3 First, collective bargaining
gives the employee a voice in the workplace, an opportunity to participate
in determining the conditions under which he shall perform his duties and
at least the form of the compensation to be received for his labors. By
pressing for health and other insurance plans, pensions, supplemental un-
employment benefits, and similar nonwage types of compensation, for ex-
ample, unions have obviously had a significant and beneficial influence on
the shape of labor's slice of the economic pie, even if they have had little
effect on its overall size. Second, perhaps the single most important contri-
bution of collective bargaining to industrial life was the creation of the
grievance and arbitration process. 4 Under this system, labor and manage-
ment have a formalized procedure for resolving disputes arising during the
term of a collective bargaining agreement, either by voluntary settlements
between the parties themselves or by reference to an impartial outsider,
without resort to economic force or court litigation.' 5 Today, about
ninety-five percent of the major labor contracts contain a grievance proce-
dure capped by final and binding arbitration.' 6 The mere existence of a
grievance and arbitration system helps to eradicate such former abuses as
favoritism, arbitrary or ill-informed decisionmaking, and outright discrim-
ination in the workplace.
Finally, unions provide working people, and often the poor and disad-
vantaged generally, with effective access to the political forum. This also
was a mission propounded by the Webbs and the papal encyclicals. Labor
organizations are naturally alert to changes in labor relations laws, tax
laws, social security laws, and other laws that might directly affect them
13. See, e.g., D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 9, at 463-65; A. REES, supra note 12, at
194-95; Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, PUB. INTEREST 69 (Fall 1979).
14. See, e.g., M. TROTTA, ARBITRATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES (1974);
Farmer, Compulsory Arbitration - .4 Management Lawyer's View, 51 VA. L. REV. 396
(1965); Feller, CompulsoryArbitration -4 Union Lawyer's View, 51 VA. L. REV. 410 (1965);
Jones, Compulsion and the Consensual in Labor Arbitration, 51 VA. L. REV. 369 (1965). See
also Abrams, The Integrity of the Arbitral Process, 76 MICH. L. REV. 231 (1977).
15. See, e.g., F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (3d ed. 1973); R.
FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS (1965); Davey, Arbitration as a Substitutefor
Other Legal Remedies, 23 LAB. L.J. 595 (1972).
16. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-
6, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 3 (1966).
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institutionally or their members individually. But they act most nobly
when they champion the cause of the unorganized and the oppressed in
the public arena. It is frequently forgotten that the AFL-CIO and several
international unions played major, possibly crucial, roles in the enactment
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."7 Organized labor has also
consistently fought for the extension of the minimum wage, for consumer
protection, and for similar social legislation, even when the interests of its
own largely middle-class membership were marginally involved.' 8 It is in
the furtherance of humane values in these various circumstances, then, and
not in supposed economic triumphs on behalf of working people, that
organized labor finds its truest vindication.
II. RECURRING ISSUES IN LABOR POLICY
A. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining
One of the more important tasks of the National Labor Relations Board
is to define the so-called "mandatory subjects" of bargaining. These are
the matters, in the central area of wages, hours, and working conditions,
about which either union or employer is required by statute to negotiate if
the other party insists.' 9 Moreover, neither party is required to sign a con-
tract if it does not finally agree on any particular mandatory subject.
These topics include employee compensation in almost any form - not
only straight wages but also vacations, insurance, retirement programs,
and even Christmas bonuses. Included also are job classification schemes,
seniority arrangements, promotion procedures, shift times, physical condi-
tions of work, and the like. The nearer one draws to the core of en-
trepreneurial control, however, the harder the questions become.2" Should
an employer have to bargain about subcontracting work? About closing a
department? About moving a plant? About introducing some technologi-
cal innovation? About starting a new line of products?
A highly esteemed and hard-headed industrial relations expert, Neil
17. See R. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO WORKER 40-41 (1967); Rathbun, Organized Labor-
Changing of the Guard, THE ATLANTIC 6, 12 (Dec. 1979).
18. See D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 9, at 465.
19. See, e.g., Allied Chem. Workers & Alkali Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958).
20. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). See gener-
ally Goetz, The Duty to Bargain About Changes in Operations, 1964 DUKE L.J. 1; Platt, The
Duty to Bargain as Applied to Management Decisions, 19 LAB. L.J. 143 (1968); Schwartz,
Plant Relocation or Partial Termination-The Duty to Decision-Bargain, 39 FORDHAM L.
REV. 81 (1970); Swift, Plant Relocations: Catching Up With the Runaway Shop, 14 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1135 (1973).
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Chamberlain, has written so eloquently on the moral implications of such
questions that it would be superfluous to do more than offer a taste of his
rhetoric. I therefore present him plain - but hardly unadorned:
The problem is highly charged with an ethical content. Judg-
ments are required as to the moral validity of legal relationships,
the justification for economic powers and distributive shares, the
degree of weight to be accorded technological efficiency, the phil-
osophical foundations for political arrangements. Here indeed
lies the final basis for decision. We should be missing the heart
of the problem if we failed to realize that legal and economic
arguments, technological and political considerations must give
way before widely held moral convictions. What is the ethical
basis of the workers' struggle for increasing participation in busi-
ness decisions? On what standards of justice and rightness does
management rest its defensive tactics? Such questions should not
produce wry smiles from those recalling union terrorism and in-
timidation, and management use of agentsprovocateurs, bribery,
and tear gas. Such condemned activity reveals the deep roots of
ethical persuasions.2
B. The Duty of Fair Representation
Under the National Labor Relations Act, all prohibited acts of restraint,
coercion, or discrimination by employers or labor organizations against
employees for engaging, or not engaging, in union activities are denomi-
nated "unfair" labor practices. 2 That term by its very nature carries an
ethical connotation. But I should like to concentrate on one particular ob-
ligation imposed on labor organizations by the Labor Act which poses in
the sharpest way the dilemma of giving operational content to ethical in-
junctions in certain morally ambivalent industrial situations. I refer to the
union's duty of fair representation. 3 Under the Labor Act, a union that
obtains the support of a majority of the employees in an appropriate bar-
gaining unit is the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees
in that unit, dissenters and nonmembers included.24 This is an extraordi-
21. N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL 8-9 (1948)
(emphasis in original).
22. National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
23. See generally Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation. A Theoretical Structure, 51
TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973); Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30
Mo. L. REV. 373 (1965).
24. National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976). See J.1. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). See generaly Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation,




nary power, the power to bind every employee through a collective con-
tract, whether he likes it or not, as to the wages he will receive, the hours
he will work, and nearly every other facet of his industrial existence. In
1944, the Supreme Court concluded that this congressional grant of exclu-
sive representational authority would raise grave constitutional questions
unless it could be inferred that the power carried with it a concomitant
obligation toward every member of the bargaining unit, supporter and dis-
senter alike.25 Thus was born the duty of a majority union to represent all
employees "honestly and in good faith and without invidious discrimina-
tion or arbitrary conduct."26
The early cases fleshing out this duty were comparatively easy. They
involved various kinds of racial discrimination against black workers, and
the Supreme Court invariably found violations.27 But knottier issues lay
ahead. To what extent should a union, for example, even if acting in ac-
cordance with its honest judgment, be allowed to sacrifice individual inter-
ests for the sake of the group? Should a union be able to trade off or
compromise some claims in order to gain concessions on others? Perhaps
the most poignant reported instance of conflict between individual and
group interests is a case that arose in the Sixth Circuit.28 A lunch counter
employing twelve persons suffered unexplained losses of food or money
and dishonesty among the workers was suspected. The employer
threatened to fire the entire crew. Rather than have this happen, the union
acquiesced in the employer's trial layoff of five employees. Losses
dropped, the five employees were permanently discharged, and the union
refused to process a grievance on behalf of one protesting worker, even
though there was no direct proof of her dishonesty. Did the union act
"arbitrarily"? Or, to put it more personally, was some harried union busi-
25. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (decided under Railway
Labor Act). See Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (decided under NLRA).
See generally Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957); Lewis, Fair
Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 81.
26. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570 (1976). See Summers, The
Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Repre-
sentation? 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977). See also Fowks, The Duty of Fair Representation:
Arbitrary or Perfunctory Handling of Employee Grievances, 15 WASHBURN L. REV. 1 (1976);
Leffler, Piercing the Duty of Fair Representation: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations and
Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 35.
27. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952). See gen-
erally Boyce, Racial Discrimination and the NLRA, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 232 (1970); Sovern,
The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1962).
See also Hill, The National Labor Relations Act and the Emergence of Civil Rights Law.- A
New Priority in Federal Labor Policy, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 299 (1976).
28. Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).
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ness agent trying gamely to make the best of a bad situation, to save the
jobs of at least seven employees rather than lose all twelve? What ethical
considerations should a reviewing court take into account in shaping the
value-laden duty of fair representation in so strained a setting? Should
learned judges or academics, after long, quiet deliberations in their cham-
bers or studies, apply their ultimately derived best moral choice as a statu-
tory imperative to the time-pressured decision of the unlettered business
agent on the firing line? If not, how will any such business agent or his
peers in other unions ever be enlightened concerning the objectively supe-
rior ethical judgment?
C Secondary Boycotts
To speak of secondary boycotts is, for many persons, to conjure up chil-
ling visions of hapless victims in the toils of overweening union power.
Before attempting to assess the reality, we should be sure we have some
sense of just what a secondary boycott is - a concept that a number of us
are not certain the NLRB itself has ever fully mastered. 29 Ace Manufac-
turing Company makes widgets. Local 100 is trying to organize its em-
ployees and secure recognition as bargaining representative. Local 100
calls a strike and puts up a picket line at the entrance to Ace. That is
traditional "primary" strike activity because it is directed at the very party,
Ace, with whom the union has the dispute.3" Suppose the strike does not
bring a halt to Ace's operations; through the use of nonstrikers, replace-
ments, and supervisory personnel, Ace is able to maintain at least partial
production. At this point Local 100 sends pickets out to Black Retailers,
which sells Ace widgets, appealing to Black's employees to strike him un-
less Black stops handling Ace's widgets. Since Black is not a direct party
to Local 100's dispute with Ace, Black is denominated a "secondary"
rather than a "primary" party, and the strike or boycott against him is
classified as "secondary" activity. This is now forbidden by section
8(b)(4)(B) of the amended National Labor Relations Act.3
When the Taft-Hartley bill was before Congress in 1947, Senator Robert
Taft, its principal sponsor, commented: "It has been set forth that there
are good secondary boycotts and bad secondary boycotts. Our committee
29. A classic article is Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 1363 (1962). Other useful articles include: Farmer, Secondary Boycotts - Loopholes
Closed or Reopened?, 52 GEO. L.J. 392 (1964); Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LMRA. 4
Path Through the Swamp, 19 KAN. L. REV. 651 (1971); St. Antoine, What Makes Secondary
Boycotts Secondary? in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW 5 (1965).
30. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
31. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
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heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us
any difference between different kinds of secondary boycotts."32 Senator
Taft's language would seem to elevate the issue of secondary boycotts to
the status of a special branch of the Problem of Good and Evil, a dignity I
do not think the question deserves. For me, this is a perfect example of a
misguided application of moral absolutes to circumstances that are inher-
ently relativistic, not to mention extremely variegated. The boycott is es-
sentially a device for exerting economic force, and, as such, morally
neutral. Its allowance or disallowance should depend on a careful balanc-
ing, on the basis of empirical evidence, of union need against business and
consumer injury.
Excessive emphasis should not be placed on the position of the suppos-
edly disinterested and innocent bystander, the secondary employer. As
several other scholars have previously observed, he really cannot be neu-
tral, even if he tries.33 The secondary retailer handling the primary manu-
facturer's nonunion-made goods will help the manufacturer if he continues
distributing the product and will help the union if he ceases. Furthermore,
if the retailer is buying a particular nonunion item because it has a price
advantage over its union competition, even the retailer's subjective neu-
trality is of a dubious quality.
Some time ago I surveyed ninety-nine cases in which the NLRB had
found secondary boycott violations over a twenty-eight month period. 4
Several conclusions emerged. First, the secondary boycott is largely a con-
struction industry phenomenon. The building trades account for seventy
percent of all violations. If the Teamsters were added in, only fifteen per-
cent of the secondary boycotts in my sample were left for the unions in all
other industries combined. Quantitatively, this should greatly reduce ap-
prehensions about the ravages of the secondary boycott. Picketing and
strikes at a common situs in the construction industry would not constitute
violations of section 8(b)(4)(B) were it not for the much-criticized Denver
Building Trades35 decision. There, the Supreme Court may have flown in
32. 93 CONG. REC. 4198 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
33. See, e.g., Brinker & Cullison, Secondary Boycotts in the United States Since 1947, 12
LAB. L.J. 397, 403-04 (1961); Fleming, Tile VII: The Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw.
U.L. REV. 666, 691-92 (1960); Miller, The Boycott. Some Recommendations, 13 LAB. L.J. 83,
94-96 (1962). See also Irving, Struck Work Under the Ally Doctrine. Some Issues and An-
swers, 9 GA. L. REV. 303 (1976).
34. St. Antoine, The Rational Regulation of Union Restrictive Practices, in SOUTHWEST-
ERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1968, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW 1, 11-14 (1968).
35. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). See also
Building & Constr. Trades Council of New Orleans, 155 N.L.R.B. 319 (1965), enforced sub
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the face of reality by refusing to categorize the general contractor and the
subcontractors on a building project as "economic allies" and thus to be
treated as a single primary employer for section 8(b)(4)(B) purposes.
Second, my study indicated that over three-fifths of all secondary boy-
cotts had an organizational objective. It has been suggested elsewhere that
since national labor policy officially favors collective bargaining, boycotts
for organizing purposes should be lawful.3 6 That point now has additional
validity since union membership is down to only about one-fifth of the
labor force.3 7 But I am not ready to conclude, for this reason alone, that
the restrictions on the boycott should be loosened. Against this evidence of
union need must be set the evidence of damage caused by secondary boy-
cotts to primary employers, secondary employers, and the public generally.
Another empirical study conducted at the University of Oklahoma found
that the injury to neutral parties was "negligible." 38 My own inquiry was
not quite so sanguine although it did indicate that primary employers have
a larger stake than secondary employers in the enforcement of the secon-
dary boycott provisions of the Act.39 But even if third parties not privy to
a dispute are little inconvenienced by a boycott, this does not automati-
cally mean that the statute is betraying its purpose. Protection of the "neu-
tral" is plainly the most appealing quality of antiboycott laws. Yet it is
evident that the proponents of such legislation were also concerned about
the plight of the primary employer who is subjected to pressures emanat-
ing from outside his workplace, regardless of whether his own employees
desire union representation.4 ° In any event, if it could be established that
unions have a pressing need to use the secondary boycott for organiza-
tional purposes, and that neutrals suffer only small harm from it, Congress
might be forced to a much more discriminating judgment than any ren-
dered heretofore on the availability of this particular economic weapon.
Congress has already drawn some antiboycott lines on an industry-by-
industry basis, and this may be a promising approach to pursue. For ex-
nom. Markwell & Hartz, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
914 (1968). Since Denver was decided, every administration except President Ford's has
favored legislation to overrule it and to authorize "common situs" picketing against a gen-
eral contractor and the subcontractors at the construction site.
36. See Brinker & Cullison, supra note 33, at 403. See also Cox, The Landrum-Griofn
Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 273-74 (1959).
37. See note 70 and accompanying text infra.
38. See Brinker & Cullison, supra note 33, at 403.
39. In the 99 cases examined, primary employers sustained "substantial" damage to
their businesses on 65 occasions while secondary employers sustained such damage on only
46 occasions. St. Antoine, supra note 34, at 11-12.
40. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1959).
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ample, the garment industry is so highly integrated that collective bargain-
ing could not exist if employers could subcontract to nonunion firms.
Congress has responded by exempting that industry, in practical effect,
from the antiboycott strictures of the statute.41 Congress has also recog-
nized the special relationships of general contractors and subcontractors at
a construction site and has permitted building trades unions to seek all-
union jobs there.42 In light of the massive power of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters vis-a-vis small individual truckers, one might
always wish to retain bans on boycotts in the trucking industry, even if
they were relaxed elsewhere.43 For present purposes, however, it is imma-
terial how these particular boycott issues are resolved. The lesson is they
should be dealt with as highly practical questions of power balancing, and
not as moral abstractions.
D. Union Securiiy
Even more than secondary boycotts, union security is an issue that many
have sought to transform into a moral question when at bottom it too is a
matter of regulating power. In this instance, what is at stake may not be so
much the respective strengths of unions and employers as the strength and
stability of collective bargaining itself. So much has been written and said
about union security that I hesitate to add to the cacophony.' But I do
not see how anyone addressing the topic I have chosen can avoid the issue
completely.
Union security takes several forms. The common denominator is a
union-employer agreement that employees must support their bargaining
representative, either by joining the union or by paying the equivalent of
the regular dues. The arguments against union security can be shortly
stated. No one should have to join a union to get a job. No one should
have to pay money to support causes he doesn't believe in. No one should
ever have to pay money to a private organization against his will.
The first three of these claims make little or no sense in the light of
41. National Labor Relations Act § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
42. Id See generally Hickey, Subcontracting Clauses Under § 8(e) of the NLRA4, 40
NOTRE DAME LAW. 377 (1965); Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of
NLRAI §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1000 (1965); Note, Rational Approach to
Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1280 (1971). See also Leslie,
Right to Control: A Study in Secondary Boycotts and Labor Antitrust, 89 HARV. L. REV. 904
(1976).
43. See Cox, supra note 36, at 273-74; Fleming, supra note 33, at 688.
44. See, e.g., Haggard, .4 Clarification of the Types of Union Security Agreements Permit-
ted by Federal Statutes, 5 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 418 (1974); Mayer, Union Security and the
Taft-HartleyAct, 1961 DUKE L.J. 505.
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existing law. The closed shop, under which only union members could get
jobs, was outlawed by Taft-Hartley.45 The union shop, under whose terms
a new employee must become a union member after a certain grace period,
usually thirty days, does not actually require true union membership with
the accompanying duty to participate in union affairs, perform picket-line
duty, and so on.46 An employee can be discharged under a union security
contract only for refusing to provide support money for his bargaining rep-
resentative.47 Even here, all that can be demanded is the union's pro rata
cost of negotiating and administering the collective bargaining agreement
on the employee's behalf; if a worker objects, the union must refund to
him that portion of the dues money used for political, social, or other non-
bargaining activities.48  Moreover, under several recent decisions of the
federal courts of appeals, a worker may not have to pay anything at all to a
union, not even to cover the organization's costs of representing him, if he
can demonstrate that he has genuine religious scruples against payments to
a secular body.49
The fighting issue, then, is whether unions and employers should be left
free to contract that all employees, at least all employees without contrary
religious beliefs, must contribute to the support of their bargaining repre-
sentative as a condition of continued employment. The argument that
convinced Senator Taft and the 1947 Congress to permit the union shop
was, of course, the "free rider" theory." No one should be entitled to the
benefits of collective bargaining without paying a fair share of the costs.
There is validity to that claim, but it does not reach the heart of the matter.
A collective bargaining relationship without union security is a collective
bargaining relationship in jeopardy. "Union security" is just what the
name implies: wholly apart from the financial assistance it ensures the
union, it provides the even more important assurance that the employer
has accepted the union as a full-fledged participant in an ongoing system
45. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
46. See generally Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion From Union Activities,
22 OHIO ST. L. 21 (1961); Lang, Toward a Right to Union Membershp, 12 HARV. C.R.-
C.L.L. REv. 31 (1977).
47. See Marlin Rockwell Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 553 (1955); Union Starch & Ref. Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
See generally Toner, The Union Shop Under Taft-Hartley, 5 LAB. L.J. 552 (1954).
48. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (public sector); Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). See generally Wellington, Machinists v. Street.- Statutory In-
terpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 49.
49. See Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2848 (1979); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir.
1978).
50. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., ist Sess. 6-7 (1947).
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of industrial self-governance 1.5  It means the employer in all probability
will not seek to divide the union's constituency by playing on the natural
antagonisms that develop between those who are and those who are not
bearing the cost of the union's operations. In all this, I may seem to have
paid too little heed to the rights of the individual worker who does not
wish his money to go to the union. But I consider that a false issue. The
real objection for one concerned about organizational control over the in-
dividual should not be to the exaction of some ten or twenty dollars a
month but to the whole concept of exclusive representation, a far more
significant institutional authority.52 As long as we adhere to the American
tradition of collective bargaining, however, that is a question settled for
each bargaining unit whenever a majority of the employees vote to install
a union.5 3
Despite all we were taught in our undergraduate logic courses, there is
often much to be learned from the argumentum ad hominem. It is instruc-
tive to contemplate just who favors and just who opposes the notion of
union security in this country. It is plainly the consensus of the nation's
foremost labor scholars that union security is desirable or, at least, that it
should be left to the process of labor-management negotiation.54 Union
security has also been endorsed by the social action organs of major reli-
gious faiths.55 On the other hand, legislative and judicial campaigns
against the union shop, and for 'so-called right-to-work laws prohibiting
union security arrangements, are commonly financed by nonunion busi-
nessmen whose solicitude for the welfare of working people in other con-
texts is something less than pronounced.56 One need not be a cynic to
suspect that these professionally managed drives are frequently less con-
cerned with employee freedoms than with union-employer power relation-
ships. If I may paraphrase without sacrilege: by their funding ye shall
know them.
51. See, e.g., L. REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 467; S. SLICHTER, UNION POLICIES AND
INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT 95-97 (1941).
52. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
53. See generally Weyand, Majority Rule in Collectipe Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L. REV.
556 (1945); note 24 supra.
54. See, e.g., D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 9, at 98-100; L. REYNOLDS, supra note 9,
at 466-69; Pulsipher, The Union Shop. A Legitimate Form of Coercion in a Free-Market
Economy, 19 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 529 (1966).
55. See Pollitt, Right to Work Law Issues.- An Evidentiary Approach, 37 N.C.L. REV.
233, 266 nn. 146-47 (1959) (citing the Division of Christian Life and Work of the National
Council of Churches, the Board of Social and Economic Relations of the Methodist Church,
the Rabbinical Council of America, and the Catholic Committee of the South, as well as a
number of the country's most distinguished clergymen).
56. See D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 9, at 101-02.
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E. Union Democracy
Union security is not the only battleground where crusaders have ap-
peared from an unexpected quarter. One of the happier ironies of recent
labor history can be found in the impetus given union democracy by the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. 57 At the time the Act was passed, the think-
ing of disinterested observers had not yet crystallized on the merits of run-
ning a union's affairs democratically.58 It is probably fair to say that the
main push in Congress for Landrum-Griffin and, particularly, its "bill of
rights" title, came from a conservative coalition that was less concerned
with promoting the individual rights of working people than with blunting
the effectiveness of labor organizations.5 9 There is hardly anything unique
in such a situation; the purification of any well-established institution is
likely to require a sizable (if unwitting) contribution by its enemies. Yet
today, most commentators would likely agree that the foes of unionism in
the 1959 Congress performed their role in especially commendable style.
By and large, the provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act respecting inter-
nal union affairs have significantly advanced the cause of union democ-
racy while doing little, if any, damage to the structure of organized labor.
Nevertheless, some reservations are in order about too hasty and naive
an equation of ethical unionism with union populism. Unions are not
merely debating societies. They are militant organizations that must act
quickly and decisively in times of crisis. Real friends of the worker would
not insist that every union decision be argued out and voted upon in town-
meeting fashion.6" At the same time, however, both management and the
57. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1976). See generally Berchem, Labor Democracy in America, 13 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1967);
Cox, supra note 36; St. Antoine, Landrum-Grion, 1965-1966: A Calculus of Democratic Val-
ues, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE N.Y.U. NINETEENTH ANNUAL CONF. ON LABOR 35 (1967).
58. A number of respected American and English authorities could be cited in 1959 in
support of the proposition that "democracy is as inappropriate within the international
headquarters of the UAW as it is in the front office of General Motors." Magrath, Democ-
racy in Overalls: The Futile Quest/for Union Democracy, 12 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 503,
525 (1959). The trend of opinion, however, has clearly been the other way. See, e.g., W.
LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 53-82 (1959); S. LIPSET, M. TROW & J.
COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY 3-16 (1962); Cox, InternalAffairs of Labor Unions Under the
Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 830 (1960); Summers, The Impact of
Landrum-Groin in State Courts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE N.Y.U. THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
CONF. ON LABOR 333, 335 (1960).
59. See Cox, supra note 58, at 820-21, 831-33. See also Thatcher, Rights of Individual
Union Members Under Title I and Section 610 of the Landrum-Grion Act, 52 GEO. L.J. 339
(1964).
60. See generally Atleson, A Union Member's Right of Free Speech andAssembly." Insti-
tutional Interests and Individual Rights, 51 MINN. L. REV. 403 (1967); Beaird & Player, Free
Speech and the Landrum-Grifn Act, 25 ALA. L. REV. 577 (1973).
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public arguably stand to suffer from the irresponsibility in collective bar-
gaining which is a possible side-effect of a massive injection of democracy
into labor organizations. Two such savvy onlookers as Harvard's Derek
Bok and John Dunlop have thus suggested, now that Landrum-Griffin has
installed basic safeguards, that the issue of union democracy should move
toward particular problems which vary from one organization to another.
They add:
in every case, the question should be, not whether any given
change will make the union more democratic, but whether it will
serve the ends of the modern union - to respond to the interests
of the membership, to promote them effectively, to deal fairly
with individuals and minorities within its ranks, and to exhibit a
due regard for legitimate interests of those beyond its walls.6
III. ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND NEW DIRECTIONS
Federal labor laws nearly as old as the Wagner Act and federal labor
laws not yet written also pose substantial ethical questions, sometimes in
painful juxtaposition to substantial competing economic or institutional
considerations. Discussed below are merely a few examples.
A. The Minimum Wage
Labor reformers for over a hundred years have sought legislation setting
maximum hours and minimum wages. With the passage of the Fair Labor
Standards Act6" in 1938, the United States became the last major indus-
trial nation to adopt such guarantees. One can hardly disparage a concept
like a legal minimum wage; it is, after all, the legislator's realization of the
ethician's "living wage" - a necessity for maintaining a family in decent
though modest circumstances. Yet not everyone has to support a family,
and there is evidence that the ever-rising federal minimum wage has had
some deleterious side-effects. It has apparently resulted in higher struc-
tural unemployment in low-paying industries throughout the country.63 In
particular, the minimum wage seems to be a factor in the astronomical
unemployment of black youths in urban ghettos where the jobless figure
has approached forty percent.64 This, of course, does not mean that we
should abolish the minimum wage. It does mean, however, that we should
be conscious of the costs of an ethical society and should be prepared to
61. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 9, at 91.
62. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976)).
63. L. REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 528-29.
64. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 14, 1979, § D, at 9, col. 2; N.Y. Times, May 5, 1979, § 1,
at 10, col. 4.
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shoulder those costs collectively, not letting them fall totally on a few. It
also means that we may need to exercise some common sense in pursuing
this moral mandate. For instance, while there are always dangers in carv-
ing out statutory loopholes, some prudent adjustments in the minimum
wage might open up many more summer jobs for minority youths in our
cities.
B. Unorganized Employees
Whatever its merits, collective bargaining is not the only way in which
employers and employees can cooperate in industrial affairs. As Pope
John wisely noted in Mater et Magistra, the exact format "must be deter-
mined according to the state of the individual productive enterprises. 65
Today in this country there are both large and small companies whose
employees, by their own free choice, are unorganized. Whether some of
them have been beguiled by wily, duplicitous employers is not for me to
say. At least insofar as any of us can be said to exercise free choice, they
have exercised it. Moreover, many of these employees are in highly
technical fields and their numbers are bound to grow. But even though
they are not unionized, their employers do not wish to ignore them. In-
deed, companies often wish to solicit their views in a systematic way. Inev-
itably, the employer or some worker will come up with the idea of a
"representative committee."66 The company is even happy to provide an
office and a typewriter. We have this sort of thing all over the country.
And nearly every one of these arrangements is, under the wooden logic of
the applicable NLRB decisions, unlawful employer "assistance" to a union
under section 8(a)(2) of the Labor Act.6 7 As some federal courts of appeals
have realized, however, section 8(a)(2) was aimed at quite different targets,
at the shabby "company unions" of the 1930's and at the employer who
gave aid and comfort to his favorite as between two or more competing
unions.8 If, in the contemporary situation I have described, the employ-
ees chose freely and knowingly and the committee or other body acts truly
on their behalf and for their benefit, no reason exists for objection save
65. Pope John XXIII, Mater & Magistra (Christianity and Social Progress) (1961), in
Gibbons, supra note 2, at 238.
66. See Sangerman, Employee Committees.: Can They Survive Under the Taft-Hartley
Act9 , 24 LAB. L.J. 684 (1973).
67. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976). See, e.g., St.
Joseph Lead Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 541 (1968); Newman-Green, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1966).
68. See, e.g., Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); Coppus
Eng'r Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1956). See generally H. PELLING, AMERICAN
LABOR 146, 160 (1960).
[Vol. 29:535
National Labor Policy
ideology.69 Should the weight of precedent be too heavy to permit validat-
ing such arrangements, the law should be changed.
This brings me to a final point about the implications of declining union
membership in the United States. While labor organizations now number
well over twenty million members, the labor force has been expanding
even more rapidly, and union membership has fallen to only 21.8% of the
total.7" That is, proportionately, less than half the union population in
Great Britain or Western Europe. Were it not for the spectacular growth
of public employee unions in the past two decades, the figures would be
even more startling. The principal cause for the shrinkage is the shift of
jobs from the manufacturing to the service industries. Unless the unions
eventually crack the formidable bastions of white-collar workers in the of-
fice, clerical, technical, and retail trades, their numbers will continue to
dwindle.
Whatever the ultimate fate of traditional labor unions, for the foresee-
able future, unorganized workers are going to constitute the bulk of the
labor force. Although they may be willing to forego the full range of bene-
fits provided by collective bargaining, it is inevitable that they will come to
demand, and an increasingly just society will grant them, that most funda-
mental of job protections: protection against arbitrary, unfair discharge or
discipline. "Just cause" will thus become a legal standard and not simply,
as today, a standard imposed by labor contracts.7 1 Europe has already
gone this route, and I am confident we will follow. Whether we shall do so
by statute or common law, by judicial or administrative procedure, I do
not know.
C Civil Rights Laws
Of all our labor laws, none is more clearly an embodiment of moral and
ethical principle than Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which pro-
hibits discrimination in employment "because of an individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.",72 The passage of such legislation
was quite expressly and quite rightly characterized by Senator Hubert
Humphrey during the congressional debates as "one of the great moral
69. See generally Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section
8(a)(2), 82 YALE L.J. 510 (1973).
70. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2000,
in HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1978 507 (1979). See generally L. REYNOLDS, supra
note 9, at 352-58.
71. See generally Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: .4 Necessary Change in the
Law, 40 OHIO ST. L. 1 (1979); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal:
Timefor a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to (d), 2000e-3(b) (1976).
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challenges of our time."7 3 His views were echoed by many others, and
there is no need to elaborate on the theme. What must be said, however, is
that the application of overarching moral precepts to particular cases is
seldom easy in a world as infinitely and as subtly complex as ours. In
practice, Title VII has presented us with a cruel moral dilemma.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was adopted in an atmosphere of monu-
mental naivete. Congress apparently believed that equal employment op-
portunity could be achieved simply by forbidding employers and unions to
engage in deliberate or at least direct acts of discrimination. Any intention
to require "preferential treatment" under Title VII was disavowed. 4 Per-
haps animated by the Supreme Court's stirring desegregation decisions of
the 1950's, the proponents of civil rights legislation made "color-blind-
ness" the rallying cry of the hour.
7 5
Today we know better. The dreary statistics, so familiar to anyone who
works in this field, tell the story. Others have provided exhaustive surveys
of the figures,7 6 and I shall not review them at any length. It is enough to
observe that after a decade and a half of federally enforced nondiscrimina-
tion in employment, minorities are still twice as likely as whites not to have
jobs.77 The median family income of blacks as compared with that of
whites has improved negligibly, from fifty-four percent in 1964 to fifty-
eight percent in the mid-1970's.78 Under the worsening economic condi-
tions of 1979 that figure fell back to fifty-seven percent. 79 Minorities con-
tinue to occupy a disproportionately low percentage of the more attractive
73. 110 CONG. REC. 6428 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). For discussions of the
controversies surrounding the Act's passage, see Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62 (1964); Vaas, Title VII: Legislative
History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966). See also Hill, The Equal Employment
Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: .4 CriticalAnalysis of the Legislative History andAdminis-
tration of the Law, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1 (1977).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976).
75. See H.R. REP. No. 914, pt. 2, 88th Cong., ist Sess. 29 (1963); 110 CONG. REC. 8921
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 7213 (interpretive memorandum submitted by Sen-
ators Clark and Case).
76. See, e.g., G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); H. HILL,
BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM I: RACE, WORK AND THE LAW (1977);
Edwards, Race Discrimination in Employment- What Price Equality?, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 572.
77. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS EN-
FORCEMENT EFFORT - 1974, VOL. V, To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 470
n.1459 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT]; UNITED STATES BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES,
SERIES P-23, No. 54, in THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN
THE UNITED STATES - 1974, 1, 64 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BLACK POPULATION STATUS].
78. BLACK POPULATION STATUS, supra note 77, at 2, 25.
79. Kusnet, Black Depression, THE NEW REPUBLIC 15, 16 (Nov. 24, 1979).
[Vol. 29:535
National Labor Policy
positions. 8° The employment situation of women in relation to white
males is similarly bleak.8'
If we are to secure genuine equality of job opportunity for the races and
the sexes within the foreseeable future, something more is plainly needed
than the mere prohibition of positive acts of discrimination and the substi-
tution of a policy of passive neutrality.82 "Affirmative action" of the sort
that has been ordered by the federal courts and federal agencies has held
out the greatest promise of success and, at the same time, has aroused the
fiercest opposition. In addition, in a momentous early decision under Title
VII, Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,83 the Supreme Court held that the Act did
not merely proscribe conscious, purposeful discriminatory treatment. Em-
ployment practices entirely neutral on their face and even in their design,
such as job qualifications or aptitude tests, were also barred if in actual
practice they had a disproportionately adverse impact on protected classes
like minorities and females and if they could not be justified by "business
necessity."84
Elsewhere I have argued at length that, despite its very real risks, affirm-
ative action in employment should be sustained under both Title VII and
the federal constitution.8" Furthermore, preferential admission to educa-
tional institutions was the subject of Professor Guido Calabresi's lecture in
this series last year.86 I therefore do not wish to revisit this ground so soon.
As a footnote to Professor Calabresi's presentation, however, I should
mention that since he spoke, the Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers v.
80. See CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 77, at 470-72; BLACK POPULATION
STATUS, supra note 77, at 2, 73.
81. See CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 77, at 470-72. The median income of
full-time female workers in the 1970's was only 60% that of males. Id. at 470 n.1459.
82. See generally Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and the Law in Labor Relations:
Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675 (1974); Edwards & Za-
retsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. I (1976);
Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971).
83. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise.: Griggs v. Duke
Power Company and the Concept ofEmployment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972);
Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company." Ruminations on Job Testing,
Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844 (1972). See also
Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimination, 1977 U.
ILL. L.F. 69.
84. 401 U.S. at 431-32. See generally Portwood & Schmidt, Beyond Griggs v. Duke
Power Company: Title VII after Washington v. Davis, 28 LAB. L.J. 174 (1977); Note, The
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures Compromises and Controversies, 28
CATH. U.L. REV. 605 (1979); Comment, Executive Order No. 11,246: Presidential Power to
Regulate Employment Discrimination, 43 Mo. L. REV. 451 (1978).
85. See St. Antoine, Affirmative Action. Hypocritical Euphemism or Noble Mandate?, 10
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 28 (1976).
86. Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 427 (1979).
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Weber,87 upheld against statutory attack a private, voluntary race-con-
scious affirmative action job-training program initiated under a collective
bargaining agreement between a union and an employer. That, of course,
does not resolve the constitutional equal protection issue raised by the
practically far more significant affirmative action plans imposed through
88government contracts.
There is no gainsaying the fact that affirmative action and preferential
treatment in favor of one race or sex raise grave moral questions, as well as
questions going to the core of American traditions of individual merit and
group neutrality. The essence of affirmative action is an effort to achieve
justice among groups; in ordinary circumstances the essence of morality
and law alike is justice among individuals.89 The Appalachian white or the
white ethnic from a ghetto may, personally, be far more disadvantaged by
his background than the third-generation offspring of a professional black
family, and yet it is the latter who will be favored under the usual affirma-
tive action plan. I justify this, not without misgivings, on the ground we
are dealing with no ordinary situation but with a national problem of stag-
gering dimensions. A group wrong has been perpetrated for generation
upon generation, and the wounds are deep, pervasive, and persistent. He-
roic measures are called for in the treatment; specifically, a group remedy
to cure this group wrong.
Even as we indulge in this strong medicine, however, we must try to
maintain a clear head. For the sake of all of us, black and white, male and
female alike, we must not allow the drug of race-conscious and sex-con-
scious behavior to become habit-forming. Affirmative action must cease
when its goals have been substantially accomplished. Termination of
these programs may not be as difficult as some might imagine. The com-
mon sense, not to mention self-interest, of society at large will make itself
felt in due course. The pride of the beneficiaries themselves will call for an
end to favored treatment when it is no longer needed. Certain special ad-
missions programs for Oriental students are already being phased out on
the West Coast.
As we move beyond the primitive initial stages of affirmative action
plans, we must avoid being enthralled by unrefined statistics in measuring
87. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
88. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2403 (1979).
89. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (any indi-
vidual, whether white or black, is protected under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)).
See also City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (female annuitants must be
treated as individuals instead of components of a sexual class for Title VII purposes). But
see Cohen, Justice Debased- The Weber Decision, 68 COMMENTARY 43 (Sept. 1979).
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our progress. To allude to what has become the unthinkable in many aca-
demic circles today, we should not even assume that all the world's talents,
ambitions, and career preferences have been evenly distributed with math-
ematical precision as if by some impersonal computer among every race or
other classifiable group on the face of the earth.9° I wonder, for example,
what a government affirmative action officer would think if informed that
although Jews constitute a mere two percent of the population, persons of
Jewish background currently hold the deanships of six of the country's
eight most prestigious law schools. 9 I shall not hazard a guess whether
that is a matter of genes, family upbringing, cultural heritage, or just poor
taste in choosing an occupation, but it surely defies explanation in terms of
standard statistical deviations. True moral judgments must start with the
facts, and there may conceivably be some facts about the rich and splendid
variety of human beings, collectively as well as individually, that we sim-
ply cannot blink.
IV. CONCLUSION
The labor movement deserves a few final words. There have been mo-
ments in its past that were touched with glory, times when it was the hope
of the oppressed, the darling of liberal intellectuals, and a magnet for
young, ardent idealists. But in the 1970's opinion polls show there is no
other major institution in our society whose leadership so consistently
lacks the confidence of the general public.92 Organized labor has lost
ground with its academic and media supporters,93 and, more importantly,
with the workers themselves. Its membership is down to a bare 21.8% of
the total labor force. Unions consistently lose over half the representation
elections in which they participate.94 While not yet a terminal case, orga-
nized labor is plainly not in the pink of health.
If it is to recover the fervor of the 1930's, perhaps the labor movement
must rediscover the best of its own traditions. This will not be all that
easy: middle-class suburbia is far removed from the battlements, and it is
90. See, e.g., The Return of Arthur Jensen, TIME, Sept. 24, 1979, at 49. But cf. AMERI-
CAN ETHNIC GROUPS (T. Sowell ed. 1978).
91. Reputations do not necessarily mean "best" in any objective sense, and certainly not
best for any particular student. For what it is worth, however, the eight law schools that
have almost invariably wound up at the top of various polls and studies conducted in recent
years are, in alphabetical order: Berkeley, Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, Penn-
sylvania, Stanford, and Yale.
92. Ladd, The Polls. The Question of Confidence, 40 PuB. OPINION Q. 544, 545 (1977).
93. D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 9, at 30-34; Freeman & Medoff, supra note 13, at
69.
94. 42 NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1977).
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hard to mount a crusade from a duck blind or a cabana. But if employees
no longer respond so readily to the lure of material benefits or if they may
even have come to share the economists' skepticism about the economic
advantages of collective bargaining, the brightest hope may lie in a return
to appealing to that fundamental interest that unions have advanced so
effectively in the past: the dignity of the individual working person and his
full, genuine participation in the life of his workplace and of the broader
community.95 That, at any rate, would be a reflection without distortion of
the principles of social justice in forming our national labor policy.
95. One of the wisest contemporary observers of the labor scene, Archibald Cox, has
commented:
None except a democratic union ... can achieve the idealistic aspirations which
justify labor organizations .... Only in a democratic union can workers, through
chosen representatives, participate jointly with management in the government of
their industrial lives even as all of us may participate, through elected representa-
tives, in political government.
Cox, supra note 58, at 830.
Walter Reuther put it even more pointedly:
The labor movement will become less of an economic movement and more of a
social movement. It will be concerned with the economic factors, of course, but
also with the moral, spiritual, the intellectual, and the social nature of our society,
and all of this in terms of an ultimate objective-the fulfillment of the complete
human being.
D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, supra note 9, at 362 (quoting Walter Reuther).
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